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Napoleon’s armies experienced meteoric success for almost a decade, from the battle of Lodi in 1796 to that of Austerlitz in 1805. This success stemmed from organizational innovation - the creation and use of army corps, essentially smaller more mobile units than armies – that allowed flexible and fast assembly of troops on the battlefield.
This greater mobility allowed Napoleon’s armies to concentrate their superior forces at specific points – in space and time – over a wide area. This gave Napoleon the capacity to keep reconfiguring the deployment of his troops in battle, take less mobile and more predictable opponents by surprise, outmanoeuvre them, and prevent them from even locating his own troops. Rather than being prisoner of the confines of a small set battlefield and a predetermined battle plan, he saw himself waging battles on what he conceptualised as a wide “strategic platform”, allowing him to exploit the greater mobility of his troops.
Yet to fully exploit greater fluidity in troop deployment, Napoleon had to maintain superior real-time insight, and a faster and deeper understanding of a battle, over an expanse of territory which was too vast to be observed directly, as the military action was planned, launched, and as it evolved. Napoleon himself was an outstanding leader who creatively blended strategies and tactics. However, what set him apart – and made coordinated fighting over vast expanses possible - was not just superior intellect, but also superior information and communication. Rather than rely on his own skills, and those of a limited central staff leading from a hill top, Napoleon was in constant contact with his field marshals (mostly young men in their thirties or even twenties). With them he explored the terrain, developed battle plans, gathered real-time information, and constantly monitored and assessed strategic and tactical situations as they developed. This gave Napoleon’s armies a fuller and more strategically acute perception of military situations, and of emerging opportunities. Where others were caught in the “fog of war”, and blindly implemented pre-set plans over a limited battlefield, he triumphed through superior strategic sensitivity over a wider expanse of territory.
Being involved in collectively creating strategies, and making tactical and strategic decisions in battle together, also heightened the commitment of Napoleon’s key officers, and their confidence in their collective success potential. This collective commitment allowed them to make bolder moves, and take more daring actions than their adversaries. These adversaries were often disoriented and paralyzed by the swiftness of Napoleon’s armies, further encouraging risk taking on the part of Napoleon’s lieutenants.
Napoleon was also able to exploit a break in history – the French Revolution – to energize his troops to fight for a better life. Promises of new land and better human rights provided a lot of extra energy and commitment for all men across the rank and file in his army. In other words, in addition to fast strategising, superior resource deployment and ‘hands on’ leadership style, Napoleon was able to touch “the hearts and minds” of his troops in a manner which brought about extraordinary commitment.
These qualities gave Napoleon’s army an unbeatable advantage over the more predictable and conventional moves of his Austrian or Russian opponents. For a few more years after 1805, although his formula was already known by then and was repeated from battle to battle, it remained successful enough, as Napoleon shifted his own priorities from conquest to administration, in France as well as in the areas he controlled. More traditional armies found it difficult to emulate Napoleon’s approach.
Fast Strategy: How Strategic Agility will help you stay ahead of the game, Yves Doz and Mikko Kosonen, Wharton Pearson, forthcoming 2007
For details on Napoleon’s armies and strategies from a management and leadership standpoint, see “Napoleon Bonaparte: Victim of an Inferior Strategy?” Chan Kim, Renée Mauborgne and Ludo Van Der Heyden, INSEAD case study 2006
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