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Leadership & Organisations - BLOG

Calmer Waters: President Biden’s Prospective Foreign Policy

Douglas Webber, INSEAD Professor of Political Science |

The new president’s foreign policy will differ from Trump’s in style, language and tone more than in substance.

Oof – thank goodness! That will be the reaction of political leaders in most, but by no means all, countries around the world to Joe Biden’s victory in the US presidential elections – as well as that of most of their citizens.

This does not mean, however, that the new president will turn Donald Trump’s foreign policy on its head overnight. On some major issues, there will be more continuity than change in the foreign policy of the new administration. On others, though, Biden will set a new direction.

The most radical change will be one of style, tone and language. US foreign policy under Biden will be more consistent, stable and calculable. It will not be made by presidential tweets. US policy will be conducted by experienced, professional diplomats, under the oversight of a president who, having long served on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, twice as its chairman, has an infinitely vaster knowledge of international affairs than his predecessor. At the level of rhetoric at least, the US will once again become a champion of liberal-democratic values.

Irrespective of policy content or substance, this change will be important. As the international balance of power continues to shift, as it will, from the West (led by the US) to the East (above all China), the capacity of the US to influence world politics will depend increasingly on how closely and effectively it can cooperate with like-minded states around the world. Biden and his team will strive to restore the US’s international reputation and image – which Trump’s unilateralist policy of ‘America First’ has so much tarnished.

A return to multilateralism

Compared with Trump, Biden’s approach to foreign policy will therefore be much more multilateral. The new president and his foreign policy team will invest heavily in repairing the damage done by Trump to the US’s alliances and to relations with its historical partners around the world. It is certain to be much less friendly than Trump towards Russia. It will not raise question marks over the survival of NATO and it will not seek to undermine the European Union as did Trump with his support for Brexit. Thus British Prime Minister Boris Johnson will likely have to abandon any hopes he might have had to negotiate a trade agreement with the US that could in any way compensate for the UK’s withdrawal from or more limited access to the EU’s internal market.

In the same vein, Biden’s administration will bring the US back into several international organisations and accords from which the Trump administration withdrew. The US will rejoin the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris climate accord, even if progress in the US in reducing greenhouse gas emissions may still be limited by the balance of power in Congress. Similarly, there is a reasonable prospect that the Iran nuclear agreement will be resuscitated.

In some issue areas, in contrast, there will be considerable continuity between Biden’s and Trump’s foreign policies. Like Trump, reflecting most Americans’ fatigue concerning military intervention abroad, Biden will be extremely hesitant about involving the US in any potentially open-ended overseas military engagements. Syria, Yemen, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh – regional conflicts of this kind will continue to burn in the face of relative US indifference.

Under the pressure here too of a sceptical American public, Biden will similarly be cautious in his attitude towards any new trade liberalisation agreements. He will avoid the kind of knee-jerk trade protectionism that was one of Trump’s trademarks, but re-globalisation will not be the aim of his foreign trade policy either.

US-China relations

For the world economy and international political relations, the US’s most important bilateral relationship will be with China. The rapid post-Cold War shift in the balance of power towards China – the US’s only ‘peer competitor’ on the world stage – inevitably generates major tensions between Washington and Beijing. The two contemporary Great Powers will be pitted against each other on issues of trade and technology (5G telecommunications), security (freedom of navigation in maritime Asia, Taiwan) and human rights (Hong Kong and the Uyghur population in Xinjiang). 

History suggests that power shifts of this kind culminate more often than not in war between declining and rising powers. Thankfully, especially given that we live in an age when war could become nuclear, history is not destiny. Keeping Sino-American relations on an even keel will nevertheless require considerable diplomatic will and skill on both sides.

Increasingly, the US will be able to balance growing Chinese power only by mobilising the support of traditional allies in Europe and Asia, many of whom Trump – to a greater or lesser extent – alienated. Mending fences, notably with these partners, will be one of Biden’s major foreign policy priorities.

Pulled in opposite directions, these countries, especially those that are close to and economically strongly dependent on China, may find the task of navigating a path that keeps them on good terms with both superpowers increasingly difficult. Some of the most intractable issues that will affect relations between the US and its allies during Biden’s presidency will likely concern their respective ties with China.

Biden’s main priorities as president will be domestic. His foreign policy will be subordinate to these. Substantively, he will not transform Donald Trump’s foreign policy beyond recognition. But – and this matters enormously – his approach to foreign policy will be very different.

Leaders of authoritarian states and populist ‘illiberal democratic’ states around the world will regret Trump’s defeat.  They will no longer enjoy the same political following wind that they have had from Washington the last four years. The rest of us, in contrast, are entitled to feel relieved that the US has stepped back from the brink and to hope that under Biden, both in terms of domestic politics and foreign policy, the US – and with it the wider world – will reach calmer waters. How long this period will last is an open question. It is not implausible that Biden’s successor will be… Donald Trump.

Douglas Webber is a Professor of Political Science at INSEAD.

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Comments
JP Knox,

Mr. Webber,

I think you need to re-consider your conclusions. Yes the United States needs support from its traditional allies in Europe and Asia when dealing with the increasingly aggressive and predatory tactics of the communist Chinese government. But the most effective tactic will be to decrease trade with China. The foundation of Chinese power and influence is the enormous balance of trade it enjoys. That balance is based on incredible human rights violations and the export of well paying industrial jobs from industrially developed nations to China.

There are several actions that, if taken by the U.S. and other countries, will restore the balance of power:

Put in place policies and measures to bring back the jobs that previous Democratic and Republican administrations allowed multinational companies to move the China;

Curb Chinese government theft of intellectual property;

Insure that the identities government officials and ex-officials currently being paid to influence public opinion and policy, as well as the amounts they are paid are publicly identified;

Jane Sommers-Kelly,

Prof. Webber/Doug - Thank you - helpful framing. We are also wondering who Biden will ask to lead his Foreign Policy efforts, given Kamala is likely to focus on domestic issues. We are praying your last sentence (re Trump returning in 2025) proves provocative and not destiny. Keep it coming pls!

Anonymous,

Professor Webber - Always nice to read your insightful thoughts. I went back to 8 years, to the classroom.

Douglas Webber,

Dear JP Knox,

I doubt whether it would be wise to try to trade less with China as such. This kind of policy would run the danger of setting a spiral of protectionism in motion that would end up hurting all sides. But I think that other countries should trade differently with China by doing more to create a more level playing field. This would certainly involve measures to ensure greater protection of intellectual property as well as, for example, to offset the effects of state subsidization of Chinese enterprises. For such a policy to have a chance of working, the US would have to coordinate its approach (more) closely with the governments of the other large Western and Asian economies in a kind of ‘coalition of the willing’.

Douglas Webber,

Dear Jane,

It is nice to hear from you! I cannot forecast who President-elect Biden will appoint to the major foreign policy jobs in his administration (State Department, Pentagon, National Security adviser). But I expect that they will be experienced officials who served in the Obama administration, whether working for Obama or Biden himself.

My short last sentence was intended to alert readers to the fact that, although President Trump was defeated in the election, he lost by a quite small margin. He and the policies he stands for still enjoy massive popular support. If he should run again in 2024 or if the Republicans should choose a candidate with a similar ideological profile, (s)he would be a strong contender – all the more so if Biden should be widely deemed to have ‘failed’ as president. This is a very real prospect if the Republicans retain a majority in the Senate after the run-off elections in Georgia in January and, as I anticipate they would, systematically block all Biden’s major legislative proposals. In other words, Biden won a ‘battle’ against right-wing populism in this election – but not the ‘war’.

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